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2Abstract
To what extent has citizenship been transformed under the New Labour government 
to include women as equal citizens? This chapter will examine New Labour’s record 
in terms of alternative conceptions of citizenship: a model based on equal obligations 
to paid work, a model based on recognising care and gender difference, and a model 
of universal citizenship, underpinning equal expectations of care work and paid work 
with rights to the resources needed for individuals to combine both. It will argue that, 
while New Labour has signed up to the EU resolution on work-life balance, which 
includes commitment to a ‘new social contract on gender’, and has significantly 
increased resources for care, obligations to work are at the heart of New Labour ideas 
of citizenship, with work conceived as paid employment: policies in practice have 
done more to bring women into employment than men into care. Women’s citizenship 
is still undermined – though less than under earlier governments - by these unequal 
obligations and their consequences in social rights.
Introduction
To what extent has citizenship been transformed under the New Labour government 
to include women as equal citizens? In the post-war welfare state under the Labour 
government, women were defined primarily as mothers, with their position in social 
security defined by their status in marriage; minimal state commitments to nursery or 
pre-school care; and the male-breadwinner/female carer model underpinning welfare 
structures, even as women themselves took to education and the labour market. 
Citizenship was clearly gendered, with women’s obligations conceived as unpaid 
care, and men’s as paid employment. Civil, political and – particularly - social rights 
were gendered too and left women more exposed than men to poverty and 
dependence. This ‘male breadwinner model’ survived in many respects through the 
Thatcher era, entrenched in government resistance to providing or supporting 
childcare outside the home, while mothers’ labour market participation fitted around 
their children’s needs. By 1992, in her comparative account of welfare regimes, Jane 
Lewis described the UK as still a male breadwinner model in comparison with France, 
where these assumptions were more modified by support for motherhood, and 
Sweden, where policies for dual earner households had weakened them further (Lewis 
1992). Among New Labour governments’ many initiatives are a Women’s Unit, 
Childcare Strategy, Sure Start, Child Tax Credits, Working Tax Credits, New Deals, 
Guaranteed Minimum Wage, Work-life Balance Strategy, many of these designed to 
bring more women into the labour market, putting an end to the post-war gender 
contract. The chapter will examine New Labour’s record in making more equal 
citizens through changing obligations in paid employment and unpaid care and 
changing entitlements in social rights. 
Citizenship and Gender
T.H. Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizenship was rooted in an earlier period of 
Labour government. It based citizenship on the development of civil, political and 
social rights, as ‘a design for community living’. His essay about citizenship and 
social class asked about the relationship between citizenship as a principle of equality 
and class as a principle of difference (Marshall 1949). But the difference of gender 
escaped Marshall’s analysis (Pascall 1986, 1993). Now Ruth Lister’s publications in 
particular enable us to understand the relationship between gender and citizenship 
(Lister 1995, 2002, 2003a and b). If the post-war labour government established a 
welfare state with different citizenship status for women and men it was a citizenship 
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Third Way concept of no rights without responsibilities (Giddens 1998) now make it 
difficult to discuss rights without responsibilities: these tightening connections now 
have clear implications for citizenship entitlements. But to what extent are care 
responsibilities under New Labour recognised as well as labour market 
responsibilities, and to what extent are citizenship rights still affected by gender 
differences in work and care?
The adult worker model is one idea of gender equality in citizenship, in which women 
gain equality with men through equal participation in the labour market. The linking 
of citizenship and paid work was central to ideas of citizenship in the second half of 
twentieth century Britain. Paid employment underpinned men’s citizenship status 
under the post-war settlement: because women were not seen as workers, the male 
breadwinner model with its family wage made women second class citizens. Joining 
the labour market to achieve equality with men has been an important part of 
women’s own actions as individuals and citizens, in search of economic independence 
and autonomy. Influential North American New Right discourse, EU concepts of 
social exclusion and inclusion, a ‘new contractualism’ which has tied rights more 
tightly to reciprocal obligations: all these contribute to a tightening knot between paid 
work and citizenship. Increasingly, paid work has been seen as the key moral 
obligation for citizens, without which there should be no citizenship rights (discussed 
in Jordan 1998, Lister 2002).
A citizenship based on difference – accepting gender difference and arguing that 
women’s distinctive contribution should be acknowledged and rewarded - is an 
alternative destination. If paid work is an important moral duty of citizenship, what of 
unpaid? Feminists have long argued that care, raising children or caring for older 
people, is important in itself, and should be recognised as work, differing from paid 
work only in so far as it is unpaid and socially unregarded (Ungerson 1987, Daly 
2002, Daly and Rake 2003). Not only is care seen as work, but as work which has a 
particular value in developing sensitivity to others’ needs, and the qualities required 
of citizens in a democracy. Thus Sevenhuijsen (1998) links care with citizenship, 
arguing that the crucial sociological message of feminist theories of care is ‘that care 
is a social activity in itself and that caring activities and caring moral orientations are 
crucial for the provision of basic needs’ Sevenhuijsen (2000: 14). This brings the 
claim for care as an obligation that should be recognised in itself, and for rights for 
carers. This may be linked to ideas of difference in feminist claims, which grow partly 
because of the limitations of the claims to citizenship based on women trying to act as 
if they were men, while continuing to bear the main responsibility for care.
A third ideal might be called universal citizenship. Structures of work, taxation, 
benefits and services would assume all adults – men and women - as responsible for 
care and for paid work and would support them in doing both. Care would be 
recognised as a moral responsibility, bringing respect and rights, allowing 
responsibilities and resources for care to be shared within households as well as 
beyond them. Such a model could be supported through policies for regulating 
working time, as in France, tax (and tax credit) regimes bringing incentives to enable 
women’s more continuous labour market participation, as in Sweden, and through 
more universal rights to childcare, work flexibility and paid parental leave. It would 
aim to replace the current UK pattern of one-and-a-half earner households with a two 
4x three-quarter model for couples, while lone parents would also be supported in 
combining employment with childcare.
In so far as the UK developed policies for gender equality under previous 
administrations, they tended to be based on individual rights. Policies for changing 
gender relations in households, bringing men into care, offer a second layer of 
possibilities. The Netherlands’ ‘Combination Scenario’ offers an example of this in 
some respects, with its ideals of equal value for care work and paid work (Knijn 2001, 
Knijn & Selten 2002, Plantenga 1999 et al, Plantenga 2002). A third potential layer 
lies in developing institutions in civil society, to enable the sharing of responsibilities 
beyond households building a ‘universal caregiver’ approach in which all employees 
would be assumed to have care responsibilities (Fraser 1997). For example, in some 
new CEE member states the EU has stimulated legislation to speed the development 
of civil society, through a percentage of taxes paid to voluntary organisations (Pascall 
and Kwak 2005). All these have their place as strategies for gender equality, but a 
‘universal citizenship’ model adds a level of social responsibility for enabling gender 
equality in work and care, in public and in households (Pascall and Lewis 2004).
What justifies this model of ‘universal citizenship’? First, the alternatives are 
inadequate for bringing real gender equality. Women’s efforts to achieve autonomy 
and independence through paid employment have brought modest success: in the UK, 
labour market participation is very high at 70% of women of working age, but 
mothers fit employment around their children’s needs and women earn around half 
the lifetime earnings of men, with poorly qualified women particularly likely to have 
interrupted working lives and part-time work (Rake 2000, Bellamy and Rake 2005). 
This model, attempting to bring women into the labour market activity on the same 
basis as men, brings problems reconciling work and family, even where it has been 
well supported: in Sweden, high proportions of both men and women report a conflict 
between work and family life, compared with the UK and the Netherlands (Cousins & 
Tang 2004). An alternative model of citizenship based on gender difference 
entrenches the public-private divide, and weakens the recognition of care in the public 
realm: this Beveridgean model has brought more gender difference and less equality 
to UK women in income or security compared with Scandinavian countries which 
have brought women into the labour market on more equal terms with men. 
Widespread agreement at an ideological level that childcare should be shared (Fahey 
and Spéder 2004), joins evidence that merging and converging of working and caring 
lives is already under way (Gershuny 2000). It can no longer be argued that fathers 
are not seriously engaged in care, while they are – in dual earner households –
undertaking three-quarters of mothers’ care time (O’Brien 2005). Children should be 
seen as a social good, not only a private one, requiring a social commitment beyond 
households (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Finally, the ‘no rights without 
responsibilities’ argument can and should be turned on its head to make an argument 
for ‘no responsibilities without rights’. It is difficult to see how parents can undertake 
responsibility for children unless they have the resources of time and income to do so 
(Doyal and Gough 1991). The universal citizenship model recognises the limits of 
individuals, households and civil society in achieving gender equality, especially amid 
growing socio-economic inequalities and insecurities and risks of relationship 
breakdown. It assumes responsibilities for paid and unpaid work, and social rights to 
time, income and care in support of these.
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Health and education systems were developed in the post-war period according to a 
social democratic model, bringing rights on the basis of citizenship. The connection 
between rights and responsibilities in the NHS and education systems served women 
well, with rights to services linked only loosely to the broader responsibility to pay 
taxes. But National Insurance brought a much closer connection between 
contributions and benefits. The post-war settlement entrenched the male breadwinner 
model – and gender difference - at the heart of the welfare state. Beveridge, in the 
Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services, argued carefully for the duties of 
married women as wives and mothers, to perpetuate the British race and ideals 
through motherhood, and of marriage as a partnership of different roles and 
obligations (Beveridge 1942). The National Insurance system was constructed around 
men’s working lives, and their contributions on behalf of their wives, and it built in 
women’s position as wives and mothers, allowing the married women’s option of 
depending on men’s contributions. The Women’s Freedom League attacked this 
notion of women’s citizenship in ‘The Woman Citizen and Social Security’: ‘The 
error – an error which lies in the moral rather than the economic sphere – lies in 
denying to the married woman, rich or poor, housewife or paid worker, an 
independent personal status. From this error springs a crop of injustices, 
complications and difficulties, personal, marital and administrative’ (Abbot and 
Bompas 1943). Of course, these complications and injustices have led to a feminist 
politics and to numerous detailed changes: women now contribute to social insurance 
in their own right rather than through their husbands. But the way that gender 
difference was built into this aspect of citizenship has continuing consequences in 
terms of women’s ability to earn rights to insurance benefits – particularly pensions –
and their vulnerability to poverty, an issue to which the chapter returns below. 
Childcare – or its lack - is the other remnant of the post-war settlement: mothers were 
discouraged from entering the labour market, assumed to be available full-time as 
mothers, state nurseries and nursery schools were closed. By the end of the 
Conservative era in 1997, UK childcare provision was recognized as the worst in 
Europe. Mothers had joined the labour market, either paying for the rapidly 
developing private sector care, or as very part-time workers who fitted their labour 
market participation around children’s needs. This opened divisions between women: 
lone mothers were particularly likely to live on Income Support, the means-tested 
benefit, and particularly likely to be poor. Women’s participation in employment is 
high. But significant residues of the male breadwinner model in the UK remain: a 
high gender pay gap and exceptional level of women’s part-time employment, 
contributing 44% of total employment. While women on average earn 78% of men’s 
hourly pay, part-time women workers earn around 60% of men’s hourly earnings (see 
below). Over a lifetime, women’s earnings average half men’s’: a one-and-a-half 
breadwinner system, which does not allow women to earn an independent income or 
pension rights (Lewis 2000, 2001). And while mothers’ part-time hours are often too 
short to bring an independent income, fathers’ average weekly working hours are 47 
(O’Brien 2005).
Work and citizenship under New Labour
The recasting of citizenship in terms of the responsibility to work is a trademark of 
New Labour, with citizenship rights seen as conditional on work, and the security of 
welfare only for those who cannot work. Work has been defined as paid employment, 
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policies to bring lone mothers into the labour market such as the New Deal for Lone 
Parents (Gray 2001, Millar and Rowlingson 2001). Policies to ‘make work pay’ have 
also brought a Guaranteed Minimum Wage, Working Tax Credits and Child Tax 
Credits to support work, children and childcare, and – more controversially – low 
levels of benefits to those not in the labour market. Encouraging the employment 
participation of women is among these objectives, according to the 2005 Labour Party 
Manifesto: ‘Work is the best anti-poverty strategy. Tailored help, especially for lone 
parents, is key but we are also committed to making work pay – with a guaranteed 
income of at least £258 per week for those with children and in full time work’ 
(Labour 2005: 75).
Some critics argue that the government’s ambition for a dual earner model is 
misplaced, and that its strategies offer too simple a model of decision-making, in 
which individuals choose on the basis of individual benefit, rather than making moral 
decisions on the basis of their commitment to children and others: ‘Mothers make 
morally and socially based decisions about what behaviour is right and proper, and 
these decisions can vary between different social groups in different places’ (Duncan 
et al 2003: 327). Alternatively, the strand in feminist thinking prioritising women’s 
independence through paid employment has been an important part of feminist 
aspirations for citizenship, even while criticising a fetishism of the work ethic that 
recognises only paid employment at a citizen’s contribution (Lister 2002). Women’s 
own actions in reducing gender differences through education show employment as 
important to women (Grimshaw and Rubery 2001: 49). From this perspective, the 
question may be whether governments have done enough to support women’s labour 
market participation, rather than whether they have done too much, especially if 
quality, continuity and pay are added to the equation as well as sheer quantity.
The flagship strategies for encouraging labour market participation – the various New 
Deals for Young People (NDYP), for the Long Term Unemployed (NDLTU) – have 
been compared with those targeting women - the New Deals for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) and for the Partners of the Unemployed (NDPU) in a gender analysis of New 
Labour’s Social Policies. Rake (2001) concludes that those New Deals which serve 
the claimant population (in which men predominate) have been much more 
generously funded – to a tune of around twice the investment per person - than those 
funding lone parents and partners of the unemployed (in which women predominate). 
Meanwhile, the development of the Tax Credit system, intended to ‘make work pay’, 
has had contradictory – and rather complicated - impacts for women. It has become a 
key system of income support, and will be discussed below. From the point of view of 
accessing work it appears to offer work incentives to lone mothers, helping to pay for 
childcare through the Working Tax Credit, while offering some disincentive to 
women living with partners because of its means-testing system based on household 
income (Bennett 2002, Bennett 2005, Lister 2002, Grover 2004).
The very strong emphasis on paid employment as a citizenship obligation is apparent 
in New Labour policies, and only occasionally challenged – as in the Tax Credit 
system example above – by alternative ambitions. But what has been the impact of 
policies? Women’s labour market participation has indeed grown under New Labour. 
At the beginning of the New Labour era in 1997 it was 63.1% and by 2003 had 
climbed to 65.3%, well above the EU 25 average of 55.1%. But the growth of 
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from 60.8% in the period preceding the Labour government (Eurostat New Cronos 
website 2005, Aston et al 2004).
[INSERT TABLE 1 around here]
The policies may have helped to keep this trend going, but they have not done very 
much more. The picture of the UK in Europe is well above average, and much further 
above the traditionally male breadwinner countries of Ireland and Malta, if still well 
behind Sweden. But this seems to have been achieved well before there were 
government policies to encourage women to join the labour market at all, with a 
60.8% employment rate already in 1992.
Employment participation is clearly important to UK women, and to their ability to 
support themselves and their families. But participation is not all. There are crucial 
limits to women’s ability to earn, with serious problems of low pay. The gender pay 
gap is 22%, well above the EU average, and the highest among EU 15 countries apart 
from Germany (Eurostat New Cronos website 2005.
[INSERT TABLE 2 around here]
The Guaranteed Minimum Wage has lifted women’s wages a little, with over 1 
million women affected, and contributing to a small reduction in the gender pay gap, 
but the minimum wage’s low level and lack of automatic upgrading have both been 
criticized, and have left many women on low pay (Toynbee and Walker 2005: 70-71).
The contribution of women’s part-time work to UK employment is exceptional. 
European comparisons show women’s part-time employment constituting nearly 44% 
of total employment, well above the EU 25 average of 30%. As in the rest of Europe, 
men’s part-time work contributes around a fifth of this. In these respects, Britain is 
much more like the traditional male breadwinner countries of Ireland and Malta than 
France or Sweden (European Commission 2004). Short part-time hours are also a 
feature for UK women, while their preferences are for working longer (Fagan and 
Warren 2001). So while women’s labour market participation is high by EU 
standards, their labour market position is marginalized.
[INSERT TABLE 3 around here]
The pay gap for full time work in 2003 was 18%. But the gap between women’s part-
time earnings and men’s full time was a full 40%. Each year of part-time work lowers 
earnings by 1%, as well as losing the 3% increase which full time workers would 
earn. For every year of interruptions to employment for childcare and family care 
work, hourly wages decrease by 1%, while doing ‘women’s work’ is another recipe 
for low earnings (Olesen and Walby 2004). Discrimination is a component in the 
range of explanations for women’s lower earnings, with part-time segregated work 
associated with motherhood, but also offering a low pay trap for women who need 
flexible or reduced working time. The National Minimum Wage may have had a 
small impact on the gender pay gap, as low wages are a feature of women’s work, 
though the low rate paid means many women still earn poverty wages (Warren et al 
2001, Bradshaw et al 2003: 14).
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mothers are particularly likely to have interrupted working lives, and to work short 
part-time hours after childbirth. While the tendency of mothers to return to 
employment has increased, from 57 per cent in 1992 to 64 per cent in 2002, the gap 
between mothers and other women aged 25-54 is bigger than in other OECD 
countries. The gap between mothers and non-mothers is especially high at 18 per cent 
for those with two or more children (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 76, Chart B5). The 
age of the youngest child is an important factor, with mothers’ employment 20 
percentage points higher when their youngest child is between 11 and 15, compared 
with mothers whose youngest child is under 5 years (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 77, 
Chart B7). Comparatively, UK mothers are near the top of the part-time league, 47 
per cent of mothers with one child and 63 per cent of working mothers with two or 
more (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 78 Chart B8).
Lone mothers’ labour market participation has been a particular target of New 
Labour, partly because of the poverty of lone mothers and their children under 
previous administrations and their reliance on benefits. There is a new expectation of 
work, with the New Deal for Lone Parents and Working Tax credits, which provide 
incentives, but not yet a compulsion to join the labour market. The participation rate 
has climbed from 44 per cent to more than 54 per cent over the past decade (HM 
Treasury and DTI 2004: 11).
One calculation of the impact of women’s ability to earn an independent living is in 
terms of the difference in lifetime earnings between men and women in Britain, with 
women earning half of men’s earnings over a lifetime (Rake 2000). It is clear that –
while some women in Britain now have careers and earnings comparable to men –
they have not on average experienced gender equality in dual earner households. In 
practice, women’s earnings are compromised by discrimination and by care. The next 
section asks about New Labour’s approach to care, particularly childcare, and whether 
it may be laying the groundwork for more gender equality in the labour market and at 
home.
Care and citizenship under New Labour
Some aspects of New Labour as ideology are favourable to women’s labour market 
participation and the public support for childcare that would be needed if women were 
to be full citizens through paid work. The social investment state sees children as the 
future (Lister 2003), while the fuller use of women’s labour can be seen as improving 
productivity. Previous administrations had assumed that motherhood came first, and 
that women could make their own arrangements for childcare if they needed it: 
childcare was a private responsibility, and maternal care best for children (Riley, 
1983, Randall 2000, Lewis 2003, Fawcett et al 2005). New Labour has brought very 
different assumptions about working motherhood, from the first discussion papers 
about the family, Supporting Families (Home Office 1998) and the National 
Childcare Strategy in Meeting the Childcare Challenge (Department for Education 
and Employment/Department of Social Security 1998, Brannen & Moss 2003, 
Fawcett et al 2005). More recently, in Balancing work and family life (HM Treasury 
and DTI 2003), the current ten-year strategy for childcare, Choice for parents, the 
best start for children (HM Treasury and DTI 2004) and the recent election manifesto 
(Labour 2005), with its long-term aim of 80% employment, Labour has assumed 
women as part of the labour market. Rather more slowly, policies for work-life 
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participation, with support justified in terms of investment in children and social 
inclusion of parents (implicitly mothers): ‘enabling parents to balance work and 
family responsibilities can make the difference between their participation in the 
labour market or their exclusion’ (Gordon Brown and Patricia Hewitt forward to
Balancing work and family life (HM Treasury and DTI 2003). 
A range of policies developed for children and parents began with Sure Start, which 
describes itself as ‘the Government’s programme to deliver the best start in life for 
every child by bringing together: early education, childcare, health and family 
support’ (surestart.gov.uk). Current aims are to provide integrated services through 
children’s centres in the most disadvantaged areas, including childcare, but going 
beyond to a range of supports for parents and children. The Child Tax Credit is now 
the key mechanism for lifting children out of poverty, while its childcare component 
assists parents with payments, currently including families earning up to £59,000 per 
year, paying a maximum of £300 per week (£175 for one child), and covering up to 
70 per cent of costs. In 2004, Gordon Brown argued that ‘the early part of the twenty 
first century should be marked by the introduction of pre-school provision for the 
under fives and childcare available to all’ (Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Comprehensive Spending Review). Such is the commitment to childcare 
as social investment, the 2005 election Manifesto breaks a long-established rule, 
proposing ‘universal’ childcare (Labour 2005: 76). All of these amount to important 
changes of principle since the Thatcher/Major years.
These shifts of rhetoric towards a more comprehensive and universal childcare service 
for pre-school children have been followed by real changes in practice (Dench et al 
2002). The government has made serious changes of policy in assuming the value of 
childcare for children and parents, and serious investments in new services. The 
promise of kindergarten places for pre-school children has now been met, with 
publicly funded places for all 3- and 4-year olds. Labour hit its target of 1.6million 
new childcare places and had developed 300 new children’s centres by 2005 and 
made plans for 2,200 more to be in place by 2008 (Toynbee and Walker 2005: 71, 
312).
But are there limits to what New Labour can achieve in childcare through ‘Market 
Means and Welfare Ends’ (Taylor-Gooby 2004a)?  New Labour’s childcare 
development has been a case study of this approach, using means-tested tax credits to 
stimulate demand, and a mixture of public and private providers to supply. The recent 
ten-year strategy for childcare explains government policy for childcare as 
‘progressive universalism, with some support for all and most support for those who 
need it most’ (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 4). Provision so far is piecemeal, with a 
mixture of public and private providers making a complex pattern, with a mixture of 
funding streams, and many poor children living outside the catchment areas of the 
sure start and children’s centres (Land 2002). Despite help through tax credits, parents 
in the UK pay around 75 per cent of the cost of childcare (Daycare Trust 2004: 10).  
Now just over half of lone mothers are in paid employment and nearly a quarter of 
lone mothers receive CCTC, which will pay a proportion of their childcare costs, 
stimulating the demand for childcare places (Women’s Budget Group 2005: 3.9). But 
the mixed economy makes access and quality uncertain (Lewis 2003). By 2004 Peter 
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Moss described the early years childcare system as ‘an incoherent and exclusionary 
jumble of services’ (Moss 2004: 24).
The new ten-year strategy for childcare Choice for parents, the best start for children
certainly plans improvements for parents and children: increasing the scope of pre-
school places from the current 2.5- hour day to a 3-hour day by 2010, giving a 15-
hour week in term-time (with a long-term prospect of a 20-hour week), and an 
obligation on local authorities by 2008 to ‘secure sufficient supply’ for families’ 
needs. There are also plans for developing a skilled workforce, and reducing the 
proportion of childcare costs paid by parents (HM Treasury and DTI 2004). The ten-
year strategy does not address the provision of childcare for one- and two-year olds. It 
also continues the policy of focussing on disadvantaged areas, thus missing the many 
poor children who live outside them (Land 2002).
Childcare campaigners have been arguing for a more thoroughgoing universal 
system, with a shift from a demand-side approach to a supply-side approach. They 
argue the need for a guaranteed supply of childcare places, a strategy for 1- and 2-
year olds, higher public spending, and reducing parents’ share of the costs, 
comparing the UK budget for childcare –0.8% GDP – with the 2 –2.5% spent in 
Sweden and Denmark (Women’s Budget Group 2005: 6.11, see also 
daycaretrust.org.uk 2004).
There has been real increase in spending and commitment to Early Education and 
Childcare. And there are plans and promises for more, including – by the end of the 
next Parliament – out of school childcare places for 3-14 year olds between 8am and 
6pm on weekdays (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 1).  But these debates show how far 
the UK is from a universal system of childcare. Despite unprecedented concern with 
women’s labour market participation, work-life balance for parents, investment in 
children through quality services, social inclusion of parents and children, we still 
have a 2.5 hour day for pre-school children, forcing parents (usually mothers) to 
patchwork care arrangements if they are to use the time for jobs. And despite 
unprecedented commitment from HM Treasury to children and childcare, the system 
relies on the unreliable: private providers who do not necessarily respond to 
government incentives (Taylor-Gooby 2004b) and 17.7 per cent of whom went out of 
business in the year to 2004 (HM Treasury and DTI 2004: 15).
Parental leaves/work-life balance/working time
Under earlier administrations, managing work and childcare had been seen – broadly -
as maternal work. Some increases in rights under previous Labour governments meant 
that women had rights to equal pay, and access to jobs, became contributors to 
National Insurance, and had rights to maternity leave, and to return to their jobs after 
childbirth. But the interrupted and part-time careers described above were women’s 
response to a social policy context which offered little positive support to 
reconciliation between paid work and motherhood. Broadly, women could have 
equality if they behaved like men, but there was little to support those who had 
responsibility for children or others.
Among other countries in Europe, Britain has signed up to the agenda on work-life 
balance in the EU, agreeing in principle with a resolution to work towards a ‘new 
gender contract’ in which issues of working time, flexibility, managing work and 
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childcare would be on our social policy agenda (Council of the European Union 
2000). It has also developed its own policy: Balancing work and family life: 
enhancing choice and support for parents (HM Treasury and DTI 2003). There is a 
string of Treasury commitments and government documents about improving parents’ 
relationship with the labour market, including Working Parents: competitiveness and 
choice, Working Time – Widening the Debate and Work and Families: Choice and 
Flexibility (DTI 2000, 2004, 2005) and now a Work and Families Bill. These all 
document the limits imposed on women’s labour market position by motherhood, 
while recognizing the value of their contribution to business and employment. They 
also admit that the UK’s provision has been weak in comparison with OECD 
countries, and argue the need for government to provide a framework to tap the 
‘public benefits’ from improving the fit between families and work, seen as 
‘expanding opportunities within and across generations, tackling disadvantage and 
increasing the productive capacity of the nation’ (DTI 2005: 14). From April 2003, 
parents have a new ‘right to apply to work flexibly … employers will have a statutory 
duty to consider requests seriously’ (HM Treasury and DTI 2003: 24). In its first year 
of operation around a quarter of parents of children under six asked for more flexible 
working arrangements and around 800,000 families secured them. There are cautious 
plans to extend these rights to parents of older children and to carers, once business 
has been persuaded that flexibility brings savings in recruitment and minimal costs 
(DTI 2005: 53).
Debates about extending parental leaves have brought significant changes under New 
Labour, as well as promises of more. Currently, Statutory Maternity Pay lasts 6 
months, which the government claims is now the longest in Europe and plans to 
lengthen to 12 months by the next election; but at £106 per week it is rather low. 
Currently mothers can take an extra 6 months unpaid. New Labour resisted pressure 
for paternity leave, showing great reluctance to make any such gesture to new 
fatherhood. But April 2003 saw the first leave for fathers: two weeks Statutory 
Paternity Pay, at the same standard rate as Statutory Maternity Pay. Paternity 
provisions announce a break with a policy past in which men’s responsibility for care 
has scarcely been considered. But we have to wait until the end of the next Parliament 
for stronger provisions for sharing parental care rather than extending maternity leave 
(HM Treasury and DTI 2003, 2004). And what is being proposed is a right for 
mothers to transfer maternity leave to fathers, rather than a right of fathers to ‘Daddy 
leave’ in their own right. This seems to entrench mothers’ responsibility for care 
rather than fathers’. The priorities in the DTI Work and Families consultation begin 
with children, and move on to parental choice, response to fathers’ demands and 
changing families, drawing to a close with gender equality: ‘This law will help give 
children the best start in life and provide parents with more choice by allowing the 
mother the option of returning to work earlier if she wants to and responding to the 
growing demand from fathers to stay at home and care for their child. This reflects 
changing family patterns, the different choices families are increasingly facing, and 
helps support greater equality at home and at work for men and women’ (DTI 2005: 
39). This ‘responding to the growing demand from fathers’ makes an interesting 
contrast to countries such as Norway and Sweden, whose governments have been 
using ‘Daddy Leave’ to encourage fathers to care (Hobson 2002, Deven and Moss 
2002). Higher levels of income replacement and the ‘use it or lose it’ principle applied 
in Norway, are needed if men are to use the leaves and become more involved in 
caring for their children (Women’s Budget Group 2005: 1). The reference to gender 
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equality in the DTI paper is rare: the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, author 
of a book about time and family life (Hewitt 1993), has pursued this ‘women’s 
agenda’ energetically, but always within a set of New Labour priorities about 
business, individual choice and market means.
Another interesting contrast with other European countries appears in Britain’s 
working time policy. France has reduced working hours mainly for the sake of sharing 
work between households rather than sharing within them, but its 35-hour week has 
nevertheless enabled families to manage childcare (Fagnani and Letablier 2004). 
Meanwhile, Britain negotiated an opt-out to the EU Working Time Directive, which 
allowed, and still allows people to work longer than a 48-hour week if they choose to 
do so. In a consultation paper on Working Time – Widening the Debate the DTI 
argued the significance of the individual’s right to work more than 48-hours, for two 
reasons:  ‘preserving labour market flexibility’ and ‘individual choice’ (DTI 2004: 
11).  The Working Time Directive could be a key instrument for promoting work-life 
balance. The government’s focus on the business case misses the benefits to the wider 
economy and society from women’s fuller participation in the workplace. The 
argument for individual choice ignores joint responsibilities and reduces choice for 
those who take responsibility for care (Women’s Budget Group 2004: 4). But while 
the DTI has been consulting on this issue, and some EU Labour MPs have voted in 
Europe to end the opt-out, it seems unlikely that the government in Westminster will 
change a policy that is so in accord with the priority given to business interests and 
individual choice.
Gender and citizenship rights under New Labour
To what extent has the New Labour agenda brought equal rights to women and men? 
Of course this is a huge topic, and can only be touched on. In particular, we should 
note those areas in which New Labour has at last come down on the side of old in 
supporting public services according to social democratic principles with public 
investment in education and the NHS, even if this is combined with Private Finance 
Initiatives. This section asks about the changes in entitlements to income under New 
Labour, and to what extent the gender differences have changed from the male 
breadwinner model which tended to put incomes and benefits in men’s hands as well 
as jobs. First, an overview of the poverty data shows that poverty is still gendered. 
The Family resources Survey, shows that 25 percent of the female population 
compared with 22 per cent of the male population were living in households with 
incomes less than 60 per cent of the median. The Social Exclusion Survey shows that 
women are more likely to be lacking two or more socially perceived necessities and 
are more likely to feel poor, to be dependent on Income support and to be poor on all 
four dimensions of poverty.  Research consistently shows that women have much less 
individual income than men, and less access to household income, and that official 
figures – which tend to be based on joint household income - underestimate women’s 
poverty (Bradshaw et al 2003, Bellamy and Rake 2005). Table 4 shows how far social 
welfare transfers in the UK reduce women’s poverty in comparison with men’s and in 
comparison with other EU welfare states.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
While women in Ireland (32%), Sweden (31%), the UK (28%) and France (25%), all 
have risks of poverty before transfers at or above the EU 15 or EU 25 average (both 
25%), welfare states demonstrate very different abilities to reduce these. While 
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Sweden and France both cut women’s risk of poverty to 12% and 13% respectively, 
below the EU 15 or EU 25 average (both 17%), the UK leaves 19% of women at risk 
of poverty, even after transfers. These data point to a male breadwinner model in the 
UK, still important in the welfare state’s capacity to respond to women’s risk of 
poverty.
There are plenty of reasons for pensions to be on the social policy agenda: the ageing 
population, inadequacies in savings, whether through personal pensions (dating from 
the Thatcher years), company pensions, stakeholder pensions. While the question of 
how to produce enough savings to keep pensioners out of poverty is on the agenda, 
the gender dimensions have been too little debated (Barr 2001, Ginn et al 2001, 
Bellamy and Rake 2005). Whether National Insurance pensions, occupational 
pensions, personal pensions or savings, men’s contributions earn them more 
entitlements than women. As cohabiting partners and wives, women may be included 
in any of these arrangements, and the allocation of pension rights on divorce is now 
more likely to acknowledge unpaid work in women’s contribution to marriage. But 
gender differences in working lives bring gender differences in entitlements to 
pensions, putting women at much greater risk of poverty.
The core National Insurance pension entitlement in the UK is the Basic State Pension. 
But whereas 92 per cent of men retire with the full state pension in their own right, a 
minority of women do so (Hansard House of Commons Written Answers 7 Feb 2002, 
Bradshaw et al 2003: 34, Hollis 2005). Older women may have taken the Married 
Woman’s Option to opt out of National Insurance, on the grounds that they would be 
covered through their husbands, as indeed, some are: a wife may receive a pension at 
60% of her husband’s rate and be entitled to inherit his pension rights. Others may 
lack entitlement because of low pay, below the lower earnings limit for contributions, 
and/or because care responsibilities as parents, or to their own parents, have limited 
their labour market attachment and reduced entitlements. For all these reasons the full 
Basic State Pension was received by only 23% of women reaching 60 in September 
2004, while on average those reaching 60 in 2005/6 have 70% of a full Basic Pension 
(DWP 2005: 73). The DWP argues that the figures are changing rapidly because of 
women’s increasing labour market participation, and the effects of Home 
Responsibilities Protection, introduced in 1978 to protect the Basic Pension rights of 
those caring for a child under 17 by reducing the number of years needed to qualify. 
The DWP seems to be building an argument for defending the current contributory 
system, on the grounds that women in their early 40’s or younger are accruing 
pension rights equivalent to men and by 2025 over 80% of women reaching pension 
age will be entitled to a full basic state pension DWP 2005: 66-82). But this solution 
will not meet the needs of those retiring before 2025. There are problems at the heart 
of the National Insurance Scheme, designed in the post-war era around men’s 
working lives and secure families. Most women’s working lives have been interrupted 
and low paid. Falling marriage rates and higher divorce rates, with now half of all 
marriages ending in divorce, mean that the Beveridgean model, which built women’s 
dependency on men into the welfare state, is not a secure framework for women’s 
pensions. New Labour’s response to pensioner poverty is to means test, to focus 
pension guarantees on the poorest pensioners. There is now a Pension Credit, paying 
around £40 per week to around 3.2 million households, with an income guarantee, 
currently £109 per week. In many ways this benefits women, whose life expectancy is 
greater than men’s and who have a high risk of poverty in old age: they have been 
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two-thirds of the recipients of Minimum Income Guarantees. But there are problems 
with this solution: the Department for Work and Pensions estimates that between 22 
per cent and 36 per cent of entitled pensioners do not claim. One solution would be to 
have care better recognised in the National Insurance System, on the grounds that this 
would value care and give more long term protection to women’s contributions 
(Women’s Budget Group 2005: 3). The Equal Opportunities Commission prefer a 
universal citizens’ pension, on the grounds that National Insurance is too much 
designed around men’s lives and will never give a secure, guaranteed pension for 
women (Equal Opportunities Commission 2005: eoc.org.ac.uk). This seems the 
stronger argument, on the evidence that the cutting and pasting of the insurance 
system to fit the changing reality so far leaves 77% of women reaching 60 unable to 
claim a full Basic State Pension. Now it seems that New Labour may be making a 
similar mistake on pensions to the post-war Labour government, both reviewing 
pensions through a male lens: in this case, and characteristically for New Labour, with 
the forthcoming Turner report, it is a business lens.
If the means test – a classic liberal welfare state response to poverty – is the current 
solution for pensions, the same strategy has brought tax credits administered by the 
Inland Revenue rather than the benefits system, as a core strategy for encouraging 
work and reducing poverty. New Labour’s emphasis on work incentives was reflected 
in a decision to pay the Working Family Tax Credit through the wage packet, rather 
than to the carer, thus bringing a potential £900 million transfer from carers (mainly 
women) to earners (mainly men) (Steve Webb MP, House of Commons debates 1999, 
col 169). At this point, the policy priority was clearly for work rather than against 
poverty. However, the government changed under pressure, and gave couples the 
choice about whether the earning partner should receive it in the wage packet, or the 
caring partner as a benefit. Since April 2003, the tax credit system has been 
significantly developed, with Child Tax Credits, paid to 90% of families, and 
Working Tax Credits, aimed at rather fewer. The new system appears to split the 
payment between carer and worker: now the Child Tax Credit addresses child 
poverty, while the Working Tax Credit offers the incentive to work. While the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies reports ‘there is nothing that requires the child tax credit to 
be paid to the woman or the main carer in a couple’ (Brewer 2003: 4), it does appear 
more widely to be seen as giving the Child Tax Credit to the main carer (Bennett 
2005). The Child Tax Credits are now a major part of the government’s anti-poverty 
strategy, and ‘the biggest ever state boost to mothers’ incomes’ (Toynbee and Walker 
2005: 71). The universal system of child benefit, paid on behalf of all children, 
remains. Hilary Land comments that we now have the closest thing to the Inland 
Revenue’s claim ‘single seamless system’ of support for families with children that 
Britain has ever experienced (Land 2004: 4).
The Working Tax Credit brings support to single people and couples who work at 
least 16 hours a week if they have children, or 30 hours if they do not and has a 
childcare element. For lone mothers, this brings a significant work incentive, and the 
proportion in employment has now reached 54 percent, an increase from 46 percent 
since 1997, while the government aims for 70 percent by 2010 (HM Treasury and 
DTI 2004: 90). For lone mothers, this employment strategy brings a better prospect of 
a long-term income than being full-time carers. They may sometimes under the New 
Deal have been encouraged to do low paid jobs, when a strategy of developing skills 
would bring better incomes and security in the long-term (Gray 2001). There also 
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remain serious problems in accessing childcare. But the Working Tax Credit, 
incorporating an element for childcare, and the Child Tax Credit, which they receive 
whether employed or not, bring a range of choices for lone mothers. The working 
hours rules for Working Tax Credit appear to give lone mothers a real choice about 
balancing work and care: they can receive support if they work 16 hours, or more 
support if they work 30. Either way, this system allows a shorter working week to be 
supplemented through tax credits, and may enable lone parents, who are mostly 
mothers, to lift themselves and their children out of poverty, and keep a foot in the 
labour market, while keeping time for care.
For mothers who are part of couples, the Tax Credit system has more mixed 
implications. The Child Tax Credit brings more material support for children and 
childcare. But there are concerns about joint taxation (Bennett 2002, Bennett 2005, 
Brewer 2003). Whereas the Inland Revenue had moved to individually based taxation, 
the Tax Credit system is built on a household means test. This risks bringing 
disincentives to labour market participation for mothers of young children, who will 
face high rates of marginal taxation/tax credit loss. Mothers in couples are also more 
likely to pay the costs of childcare.  The maximum proportion of the costs covered by 
tax credits is 70%. It is also targeted on smaller families, making childcare costs a 
significant barrier to work for mothers in larger families (Land 2004).
Equal citizenship under New Labour?
If we go back to the three concepts of gender equality in citizenship outlined at the 
beginning, we can ask to what extent New Labour ideology and policy have moved 
towards gender equality in each of the concepts.
The adult worker model of gender equality, in which women join the labour market 
on the same terms as men, has been strongly developed under New Labour. The 
underpinning assumptions have changed radically from the male breadwinner model, 
to the point where the assumptions about women as workers have overtaken the real 
ability of women to earn independence for themselves (Lewis 2001). Core New 
Labour ideas – equality of opportunity, no rights without responsibilities, market 
means/welfare ends – these have favoured women’s labour market participation, and a 
range of measures to improve their incentives to work and their ability to do so. These 
have included a commitment to ‘universal’ childcare, while the extent to which they 
can achieve this through market means may be limited (Lewis 2005).
The gender difference model – represented in the UK by the male breadwinner model, 
instituted under the post-war Labour government – has proved unable to produce 
gender equality, as care was unpaid, and therefore undervalued. It has also proved 
vulnerable to one of the new risks: marriage and relationship insecurity bring income 
insecurity to women under a system which attached benefits to a male ‘family wage’. 
However, the literature about care has raised real issues about its importance and 
relationship with citizenship. Care and carers are a little higher up the political 
agenda, with child tax credits paid to the main carer, and longer maternity pay 
(Bellamy and Rake 2005: 15). The negative in these developments is that care issues 
are on New Labour’s agenda in so far as they mesh with labour market issues and 
little further. As Rake argues: ‘New Labour runs the risk of pursuing the citizen 
worker agenda at the expense of any richer and more just understanding of what 
constitutes citizenship’ (Rake 2001: 227).
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And what of a third model of gender equality in citizenship, which would support
citizenship obligations as both work and care, bringing men into care as women have 
been brought into work, and move towards replacing the one-and-half earner with a 
two x three-quarter model? The UK population is moving in this direction, in terms of 
childcare ideals (Fahey and Spéder 2004) as well as practices. The position is not one 
of equity between men and women, but of convergence in the time given to childcare, 
with men in dual full-time earner couples in 2000-1 spending 75% of the time given 
by women (O’Brien 2005: 4). New Labour seems old-fashioned: happy to support 
changed gender roles for mothers, including a combined model of work and care for 
lone mothers, it has been extremely reluctant to promote changes in fatherhood, 
containing working hours, or enabling fathers to care. While government documents 
are littered with references to responsibility to work, it is difficult to find any official 
reference to any moral responsibility of fathers to care. Where there is support for 
fathers as carers, as in the new paternity leave, it is offered in terms of consumer 
choice rather than moral responsibility. New Labour’s support of individual choice in 
relation to working hours and the 48-hour opt-out, and its hesitant succumbing to 
pressure over paternity leave, proposals for mothers to control fathers’ access to 
leave: these suggest a traditional model of gender roles in the family. This traditional 
model under-uses and under-develops women’s capacities at work and men’s 
capacities in care, and will not bring gender equality in family or public life.
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Table 1: Female and male employment rates, as percentage of women and
men aged 15 to 64, and difference between male and female, 20051
Employment rate: 
female
Employment rate: 
male
Employment rate 
Male – female
Sweden 70.4 74.4  4.0
Denmark 71.9 79.8  7.9
Slovenia 61.3 70.4  9.1
Hungary 51.0 63.1 12.1
France 57.6 68.8 11.2
Germany 59.6 71.2 11.6
UK 65.9 77.6 11.7
Ireland 58.3 76.9 18.6
Malta 33.7 73.8 40.1
EU 27 56.0 70.8 14.8
Source: Eurostat structural indicators Europa NewCronos website 2006 and author’s 
calculations
                                                
1 The employment rates are calculated by dividing the number of women aged 15 to 64 in employment 
by the total female population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force 
Survey. The survey covers the entire population living I private households and excludes those in 
collective households such as boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. Employed population 
consists of those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay or profit for at lease one 
hour, or were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent.
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Table 2: Part-time workers as percentage of total employment, 2005
Part-time rate: 
female
Part-time rate: male Part-time rate 
female: male
Sweden 39.6 11.5 3.4: 1
Denmark 43.8  7.8 5.6: 1
Slovenia 11.1  7.2 1.5: 1
Hungary  5.8   2.7 2.1: 1
Poland 14.3   8.0 1.8: 1
Netherlands 75.1 22.6 3.3: 1
France 30.7  5.7 5.4: 1
Germany 43.8  7.8 5.6 :1
UK 42.7 10.4 4.1: 1
Ireland (2002) 30.4  6.5 4.7: 1
Malta 21.1  4.5 4.7: 1
Euro area 34.8  6.9 5.0: 1
EU 25 32.4  7.4 4.4: 1
Source: European Commission/Eurostat 2007 Living conditions in Europe (Table 3.2: 
46) and author’s calculations.
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Table 3: Women in decision-making
Percentage of 
women Senior 
Ministers in 
national 
government
Percentage of 
women 
members of 
single/lower 
house 
Parliaments
Percentage of 
women at one 
level below the 
minister
Percentage 
of women 
at two 
below 
minister
Sweden 52 45 40 45
Slovenia  7 15 41 67
Hungary 12  9  3 23
Poland  6 22 29 31
France 18 13  0 18
Germany 33 33 11  9
UK 27 18 21 18
Ireland 14 13  11 11
Malta 15  9  7 12
Average EU 25 23 23 16 24
Source: European Commission Database on Women and Men in Decision-making 
2005
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